24. Japanese Diet Accepts Cabinet's Counter Proposals

At the Japanese Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941, the Japanese counter proposals drawn up by the Foreign Ministry were approved. Therefore, Tokyo wired Ambassador Nomura further instructions concerning their delivery to the American government.

The Foreign Ministry instructed Ambassador Nomura to submit proposal "A" for discussion in spite of the fact that many of the terms in the last United States proposal had not met with Tokyo's approval. If the United States objected too strongly to Proposal "A", Ambassador Nomura was instructed to advise the Japanese Foreign Ministry and then, subsequently, offer proposal "B" to the United States.

Because the situation had become so critical and no further delay could be tolerated, the Japanese government informed Ambassador Nomura that it had made its final concession. However, it warned Ambassador Nomura to avoid giving the United States the impression that this proposal was actually Japan's ultimatum. [73]

The Japanese government was certain that some agreement could be reached through the efforts of its representatives, the Foreign Minister continued, since the problem of self defense stemming from the Tripartite Treaty had been clarified to the United States' satisfaction. American policies were set forth completely in the proposal of June 21, 1941 and had been answered by the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941; and the new Japanese Cabinet took it for granted that all further exchange of notes would be eliminated from the negotiations. The Foreign Minister urged Ambassador Nomura to make it clear to the United States that Japan wished to avoid the exchange of documents. [74]

Although Foreign Minister Togo realized the difficulty of culminating negotiations immediately, he urged Ambassador Nomura to complete all arrangements for the signing of a mutual agreement by November 25, 1941. [75]

25. Ambassador Nomura to Guard Secrecy of Conferences

In reply to Tokyo's instructions, Ambassador Nomura informed the Japanese Ministry on November 5, 1941 that he would continue his efforts to bring about a satisfactory understanding. Toward this end, he planned to make arrangements for meeting with President Roosevelt in the near future.

In his own opinion, Ambassador Nomura felt that these conferences with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull should remain secret. However, if the Foreign Office desired that they be considered as official interviews, Ambassador Nomura promised to announce them to the public. [76] The Japanese government agreed with Ambassador Nomura that the present informal conversations should remain secret. If the newspapers of either country were allowed to speculate on the questions discussed, at Ambassador Nomura's conferences with President Roosevelt, the Foreign Ministry felt that the effectiveness of an informal agreement would be impaired. In fact, the Japanese government urged that Ambassador Nomura avoid publicity of any subsequent conferences with American officials. [77]

26. Japanese Newspapers Publicize Tokyo's Proposals

In spite of the efforts of both governments to maintain the secrecy of these conferences, on November 5, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that the United States newspapers, through the Domei News Agency in Japan and the Times Advertiser, had learned

[73] IV, 42.

[74] IV, 43.

[75] IV, 44.

[76] IV, 45.

[77] IV, 46.

16

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

that November 15, 1941 was the Japanese "deadline" for the successful conclusion of negotiations. In fact, these two newspaper syndicates, known to be the official press of the Japanese government and the Foreign Office, respectively, stated their intention to list the seven Japanese demands upon the United States.

Realizing that the Japanese government wished a favorable reception of its negotiations, Ambassador Nomura believed that the publication of such statements in Japanese newspapers would alienate American public opinion. Therefore, although appreciating the seriousness of Japan's internal situation and the grave responsibility of Foreign Minister Togo's position, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless urged that the Foreign Office censor the material given to Tokyo newspapers. [78]

27. Japanese and American Newspapers Impair Diplomatic Negotiations

In spite of censorship measures enforced by the Japanese Foreign Office, newspaper speculation on the outcome of the Japanese‑American conversations continued to impair diplomatic negotiations. Even while Ambassador Kurusu was enroute to the United States to supplement Ambassador Nomura's efforts for peace, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi was labeling America's negotiations as a means of gaining time to complete military preparations against Japan. [79]

Conditions as reported by the New York Times, November 6, 1941 were so close to a crisis that the United States Congress voted to remain in session indefinitely. [80]

Apparently Washington newspapers did not place much faith in Mr. Kurusu's appointment as advisor to Ambassador Nomura. In spite of Ambassador Nomura's efforts to curtail unfavorable newspaper stories, he reported to Tokyo on November 6, 1941 that conjectures on the effect of Mr. Kurusu's presence in Washington were being published constantly. [81]

If these stories once reached the Japanese public, Ambassador Nomura feared that conditions would become even more tense. In view of the Japanese internal situation, Ambassador Nomura urged that every precaution be taken to control the Japanese press and force them to follow an editorial policy in keeping with the tone of Japanese‑American conversations. [82]

29. Hull‑Nomura Conversation (November 7, 1941)

a. State Department's Report [84]

Accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment at his own request on November 7, 1941. Without permitting the Japanese Ambassador to state the purpose of his call, Secretary Hull immediately brought up the question of the three American missionaries interned by the Manchurian authorities at Harbin. Secretary Hull declared that similar situations, together with the extremist policies voiced in the Japanese press, made it difficult for the United States to continue normal diplomatic relations with Japan. When reports of anti‑American activities were released in this country, Secretary Hull stated, people questioned the advisability of improving relations with Japan. Ambassador Nomura replied that until recently he had not received any instructions from the new Japanese Cabinet. However, he now had the authority to resume the conversations.

After deliberating on the various proposals for peace, particularly on the American draft of June 21, 1941, the new Japanese Cabinet had decided upon the maximum concessions it

[78] IV, 47.

[79] New York Times, November 6, 1941, 1:4‑8.

[80] New York Times, November 6, 1941, 6:3.

[81] IV, 48.

[82] Ibid.

(No footnote 83 in text. LWJ)

[84] "Memorandum of a Conversation"‑November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 706‑709.

17

would make in order to alleviate the situation in the Far East. Referring to the three principal questions upon which the respective views of the two countries had diverged, Ambassador Nomura said that it would not be difficult to reconcile the views concerning Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact and non‑discrimination in international commercial relations. However, he was aware that some difficulties would arise out of Japan's desire to retain certain troops in North China and Inner Mongolia.

In view of the grave situation which might arise if any misunderstandings or misinterpretations of policies occurred at this time, Ambassador Nomura had asked for and received from his government an experienced diplomat, namely Mr. Kurusu, the former Ambassador to Germany. In view of Mr. Kurusu's Ambassadorial rank, Ambassador Nomura hoped that President Roosevelt would speak with him. At this point in the conversation, Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull a document prepared by the Japanese government in connection with its views on the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China and French Indochina and the principle of non‑discrimination. [85]

With regard to the Japanese forces stationed in China as a result of the Sino‑Japanese War, the Japanese government stated that it would be necessary to retain troops in specified areas in North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan Island for a certain time after the restoration of peace between Japan and China. As soon as general peace was restored, however, the other forces would begin their withdrawal according to a separate agreement between Japan and China and this withdrawal would be completed within two years after the peace treaty. When an equitable basis was established in East Asia and the China affair settled, Japanese forces would be recalled from French Indo‑China and, in this way, the territorial sovereignty of that country would be guaranteed.

With regard to the principle of commercial nondiscrimination, the Japanese government agreed to the application of this principle throughout the Pacific area, including China. It was understood at the same time, however, that the principle would be applied to the entire world. [86]

After reading the document, Secretary Hull asked concerning the proportion of Japanese troops to be retained in the areas stated. In reply the Japanese Ambassador reminded Secretary Hull that, under the Boxer Protocol, Japan had the right to station troops in the Peiping and Tientsin areas. Since Soviet Russia maintained forces in Outer Mongolia, Japan desired to station .enough of its own troops in Inner Mongolia to balance those of Russia. Without specifying the exact number of troops that Japan wished to retain in China, Ambassador Nomura began to discuss the armed forces maintained by other countries in China. He referred specifically to March 1927 when Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑Shek first entered Shanghai. As a result of that action the British had requested Japan to take joint action to prevent this measure. Yet, in spite of the fact that the Japanese had declined to interfere in Chinese affairs, they soon after became the object of a bitter Chinese boycott campaign. In discussing the Chinese question, Secretary Hull said that he had mentioned these exploratory conversations to the Chinese Ambassador but had not acquainted him with any of the points under discussion.

However, before entering into any formal negotiations with Japan, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that the United States planned to negotiate with the Chinese, British and Dutch. Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura whether Japan would launch

[85] Ibid.

[86] Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 709‑710. For Japanese version of text sent to Ambassador Nomura on November 4, 1941 and decoded by American cryptanalysts see IV, 25‑28. It is well to note the explicit terms in which the Japanese government instructs Ambassador Nomura on the presentation of these proposals. For English translation of Japanese proposals sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura, see IV, 37‑39.

18

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

on a true new order in the Far East and, in this way, gain its leadership in the Pacific if the Chinese expressed an earnest desire to end the present war.

Referring again to the advantages derived by the United States from the renunciation of its aggressive policies in the Latin American countries, Secretary Hull expressed the conviction that Japan would derive trade advantages from the adoption of a similar policy in its relations with China. Secretary Hull hoped that some concrete agreement could be worked out on the question of Japanese relations with the Axis powers. Secretary Hull pointed out that the mere manifestation of the desire for peace might not be adequate if a new government came into power in Japan.

In view of the urgency of the internal situation in Japan, Ambassador Nomura requested that the American Department of State expedite the study of the document delivered on this day. Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed an interview with President Roosevelt. Stating that he would comply with the Ambassador's request, Secretary Hull then asked whether this document was to be viewed in conjunction with the previous Japanese documents which had been submitted. Replying in the affirmative, Ambassador Nomura mentioned the United States' document of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese document of September 25, 1941. Secretary Hull reminded him that the American document of October 2, 1941 was to be included in this category. [87]

b. Ambassador Nomura's Report

After first scheduling an appointment with Secretary Hull for Minister Wakasugi and himself, [88] and after ascertaining the phraseology and interpretation of his government's latest proposals, [89] Ambassador Nomura visited Secretary Hull secretly on November 7, 1941. [90]

During the conversation with Secretary Hull and Mr. Ballantine, Ambassador Nomura   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  explained that he had been ordered to clarify his government's position to both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in the hope of settling the various problems existing between Japan and the United States. In reply Secretary Hull commented that the two political factions at varying odds in the world today were threatening to throw all civilization into the chaos of anarchism. Therefore, Secretary Hull urged that American and Japanese representatives find a basis for maintaining peace in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura took this opportunity to point out that agreements had been reached on two of the three outstanding Pacific problems. In regard to the third, the stationing of troops in China, the Japanese government was now prepared to make further concessions in order to meet the demands of the United States. Because of the conciliatory attitude of his government, Ambassador Nomura requested that the United States take a philosophical view toward the questions relating to the Far East. [91]

In view of the critical domestic situation in Tokyo which had become more tense during the six months of informal conversations with the United States, Japan was now prepared to make the maximum number of possible concessions in order to bring the present negotiations to a satisfactory close. After these introductory remarks Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull the Japanese government's counter proposal. [92]

After reading this document Secretary Hull showed indications of being satisfied with Japan's comments on America's desire for non‑discrimination in commerce. However, Secretary Hull refused to commit himself regarding Japan's proposal for the withdrawal of troops, or toward Japan's attitude regarding the rights of self defense. [93] Nevertheless, the

[87] "Memorandum of a Conversation"‑November 7, 1941, S.D. I, 706‑709.

[88] IV, 50.

[89] IV, 51.

[90] IV, 52.

[91] IV, 53.

[92] IV, 54.

[93] IV, 52, 54.

19

American Secretary of State did ask what proportion of Japanese troops would be withdrawn from China. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan was willing to withdraw the greater number of its troops now stationed in China. Then the Japanese Ambassador went on to emphasize Japan's attitude toward "the right of self‑defense." After examining the Japanese proposals more carefully, Secretary Hull said the United States government would be ready to give Japan its reply.  [94]

At the same time, however, Secretary Hull continued, the United States representatives would consider it necessary to discuss the methods for maintaining peace in the Pacific with representatives of Great Britain, China and the Netherlands East Indies. From Secretary Hull's remarks Ambassador Nomura concluded that China had already been consulted regarding the matters relating to the settlement of its affairs in the Far East. As if to prove Ambassador Nomura's assumption Secretary Hull then inquired what Japan's attitude would be if the United States arranged for conversations between "the person of highest influence and integrity in China" with suitable Japanese representatives. Minister Wakasugi asked if the United States would first determine whether China desired to resume friendly relations with Japan. Since Secretary Hull claimed only to have thought of this suggestion during the day's conversation, he declined to expound on the theory. However, he requested that Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi relay this proposal to their government and ascertain its attitude toward the matter. [95]

During this conversation Secretary Hull brought up the incident arising out of the imprisonment of American missionaries in Harbin. Reminding Ambassador Nomura that three Japanese Naval officers had been allowed to return to Tokyo, Secretary Hull stated that the United States government could not sympathize with Japan's unreasonable treatment of American citizens. Insisting that this incident involved only Manchurian officials and not the Japanese government, Ambassador Nomura, nevertheless, promised to refer the question to Tokyo with the request that suitable steps be taken to release the missionaries in question. [96]

30. Tokyo Re‑emphasizes Policy of Self‑Defense

After receiving Ambassador Nomura's report of his conversation with Secretary Hull, Tokyo asked the Japanese Ambassador in Washington if he had explained in detail Japan's views concerning the rights of self‑defense. [97] Foreign Minister Togo reminded Ambassador Nomura that he had elaborated on this Japanese policy in his earlier instructions concerning the Japanese counter‑proposals. If this message had not reached Ambassador Nomura in time, Foreign Minister Togo requested that the Japanese Ambassador make certain to explain the matter fully to the American representatives. [98]

31. Mr. Horiuchi Arranges for Undelayed Delivery of Telegrams

In view of the urgency of the present American‑Japanese negotiations Mr. Horiuchi, telegraphic clerk of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, felt it necessary to make certain provisions for the delivery of urgent telegraphic messages. [99] On November 8, 1941 he informed the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo that with a crisis so near at hand all instructions between Tokyo and Washington must be received without any delay. By way of emphasizing his point Mr. Horiuchi reminded the Japanese Foreign office that at 9:56 p.m. on November 5, 1941 he had sent Ambassador Nomura's message relating to the English translations

[94] IV, 54.

[95] IV, 55‑56.

[96] IV, 57.

[97] IV, 58.

[98] Ibid.

[99] IV, 59.

20

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

of the Japanese counter proposals. It was presumed that this message reached Tokyo on November 6, 1941. However, the Japanese reply did not arrive in Washington until 8:20 a.m. Washington time, on November 7, 1941. Since Ambassador Nomura's appointment with Secretary Hull was scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on November 7, 1941, the Japanese Embassy was allowed only forty minutes in which to decode and revise the message. In view of the fact that all officials connected with the telegraphic office remained on duty all night when expecting an urgent message from Tokyo, Mr. Horiuchi requested that the Foreign Office send any reply over the wires immediately regardless of the hour. Formerly, Mr. Horiuchi continued, the telegraph company notified the Embassy whenever a "very urgent" telegram was received. Since the Japanese Foreign Office had recently changed the word to "kinqu" the delivery of many important messages had been delayed. In order to avoid this delay in the future, Mr. Horiuchi asked that all important telegrams be captioned "very urgent". [100]

In replying to Mr. Horiuchi's request the telegraphic section of the Foreign Office in Tokyo stated that in the future all messages headed by the words "kinqu" or "daiqu" were to be given the same handling by the telegraphic companies as those marked "very urgent". By way of explaining the delay in replying to Ambassador Nomura's message, Tokyo stated that unfavorable atmospheric conditions had held up the dispatch until 1734 on November 7, 1941. [101]

32. Foreign Ministry Bans Publication of Negotiations

Agreeing with Ambassador Nomura's request that secrecy be maintained throughout the Japanese‑American negotiations, [102] the Foreign Office stated that it would attempt to guide public opinion by censoring unfavorable comments regarding the present conversations. [103] Furthermore, Tokyo promised that the contents of these negotiations would be kept from the press and that any information regarding the time of the Japanese‑American conversations would be suppressed. Already the Japanese government had warned the Times that the publication of any contents capable of exciting anti‑Japanese feeling in the United States would bring about dire consequences. While promising to curtail the activities of Japanese newspapers in Tokyo, the Foreign Office took the opportunity of pointing out security breaks in the newspapers throughout the United States. For example, the Domei office in Washington had already printed articles entirely out of keeping with Tokyo's policy of maintaining a calm and patient attitude toward the American conversations. [104]

To be more explicit Foreign Minister Togo referred to the Associated Press dispatch from Manila which quoted Ambassador Kurusu as stating, "I am going to Washington but I have no great hope for a successful conclusion to the negotiations." [105] As a result of this newspaper report, the American public, felt that no new compromise which Japan offered would be able to meet the demands of the United States. [106]

33. President Roosevelt Confers with Naval Leaders (November 7, 1941)

On November 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported that on the previous day President Roosevelt had conferred secretly with Secretary of the Navy Knox, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and other American naval leaders. Although uncertain of the actual purpose of the meeting, Ambassador Nomura surmised that President Roosevelt wished to discuss

[100] Ibid.

[101] IV, 60.

[102] IV, 47.

[103] IV, 61.

[104] Ibid.

[105] IV, 62; N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1941, 1:40.

[106] Ibid.

21

the latest Japanese counter proposals and to formulate a method of withdrawing American Marines from China. [107]

34. Japan Interested in Secretary Hull's Proposed Settlement of the China Affair

After carefully considering Ambassador Nomura's report on his conversations with Secretary Hull, the Japanese government exhibited great interest in Secretary Hull's proposed settlement of the China affair. [108] In view of the fact that Secretary Hull had suggested that a high ranking Chinese official discuss Far Eastern problems with the Japanese representative, the Japanese government felt that the United States was now willing to permit Japan and China to settle their differences directly and without American interference. Naturally Tokyo expected that Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek would initiate the move for peace. Recognizing Secretary Hull's suggestion as a great contribution toward Sino‑Japanese peace, Foreign Minister Togo urged Ambassador Nomura to secure more information on America's concrete plans for carrying the suggestion into effect. [109]

Foreign Minister Togo felt that the United States, as well as Japan, was fully aware of the importance of the Chinese question on Far Eastern peace. If the United States actually proposed to leave the settlement of peace terms up to the Japanese Chinese governments themselves, then Tokyo felt the question of withdrawing its troops from China could be left out of future negotiations with the United States. In this way not only could Japanese‑Chinese peace be effected without further American interference, but the relations between Japan and the United States could be settled quickly and satisfactorily. Before going ahead with Secretary Hull's proposal, however, the Japanese government felt it necessary to secure a guarantee that the United States would not interfere with the peace terms established between Japan and China. This guarantee would naturally include the cessation of any American activities designed to aid Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek in his war upon Tokyo. Naturally the Japanese government also expected that an agreement between Japan and the United States for the settlement of their respective problems in the Pacific would be signed without further delay. [110]

If Ambassador Nomura determined that Secretary Hull's suggestion was a workable one, then the Japanese Ambassador was to eliminate the stipulations regarding Japanese‑Chinese peace from proposal A submitted to the American government; instead that section of proposal B, requesting that the United States refrain from any action detrimental to the establishment of peace between Japan and China, should be substituted in its place.

In view of the fact that Foreign Minister Togo firmly believed the United States sincerely wished to establish an agreement between its government and Japan, he felt that Secretary Hull's proposal could be carried out. Nevertheless, the Japanese government insisted that its negotiations with the United States be brought to a satisfactory conclusion even before the Japanese‑Chinese peace was concluded. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Togo reemphasized the fact that the United States must cease all aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek during Japanese peace negotiations. [111]

35. Japan Seeks Facts on American‑British Attitude Toward Axis

In order to determine the true facts concerning the existing international situation, the Japanese Vice‑Chief of the General Staff on November 9, 1941 in a circular message to the

[107] IV, 63.

[108] IV, 64.

[109] Ibid.

[110] IV, 65.

[111] IV, 66.

22

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Embassies abroad requested any and all information regarding the British and American attitude toward Japan and Germany. [112]

In order to determine to what extent. Japan could go before the two Allies would open war on the Axis Powers, Tokyo asked for detailed information regarding American reciprocal relations with Japan and Germany and the military, political and economic union between the United States, Great Britain, China, Holland and Russia. Japan also wished to determine the influence that it had upon America, Great Britain and these other countries, and to see how greatly the Japanese‑American negotiations had affected the international situation.

Since Japan was aware of the American and British increased defenses in the Pacific, Tokyo asked for an evaluation of the present situation regarding the expansion of the island bases scattered around the Pacific, the dispatch of additional American and British military strength to the South Pacific and to the Aleutians, and, finally, the movements of American and British troops in China, the southwest Pacific and in Japan. [112a]

36. Grew‑Togo Conversation (November 10, 1941)

a. Ambassador Grew's Report [113]

During a meeting on November 10, 1941 at which Mr. Togo, Ambassador Grew, Counselor Dooman and Mr. Kase were present, the Japanese Foreign Minister referred to a conversation with the American Ambassador held on October 30, 1941 during which he had asserted his desire to maintain friendly relations between the United States and Japan.

After carefully studying the documents which had been passed by the representatives of the two countries thus far, Mr. Togo was more determined than ever to maintain peace in the Pacific. Keeping in mind that the object of the present Japanese Cabinet was to establish a "Greater East Asia", as its contribution to world peace, Mr. Togo's government had formulated new proposals and sent them to Ambassador Nomura as the basis for negotiations with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. At this point, Ambassador Grew emphasized that the conversations taking place between the two governments were "only preliminary and exploratory". While not wishing to press the point, Mr. Togo stated that he felt the time had come for formal and official negotiations.

Then Mr. Togo thanked the American government through Ambassador Grew for the assistance which it had given Mr. Kurusu in his journey from Tokyo to Washington to take his place as advisor to Ambassador Nomura. Aware of Ambassador Grew's previous efforts to re‑establish friendly relations between Japan and the United States, Mr. Togo pledged his cooperation toward finding a compatible solution. Nevertheless, after reviewing the documents recording the conversations which had already taken place, Foreign Minister Togo believed that the United States lacked an adequate appreciation of the Far Eastern situation. While Secretary Hull was apparently aware, from his own statements, that Japan was a stabilizing force in the Far East, the attitude of the United States government as a whole did not support this fact. Foreign Minister Togo felt that the United States government must take into consideration that Japan had been at war with China for four and a half years and this had a strong bearing on the Pacific situation. [114] Foreign Minister Togo then recalled a conversation between Secretary Hull and Minister Wakasugi on October 16, 1941 during which Secretary Hull had remembered telling former Ambassador Saito that he recognized Japan as a stabilizing force and was prepared to express such recognition in an official manner. [115]

[112] IV, 67. This message was not translated until February 3, 1945.

[112a] Ibid.

[113] Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" November 10, 1941, S.D. II, 710‑714.

[114] Ibid.

[115] This statement attributed to Secretary Hull by Foreign Minister Togo is not recorded in Secretary Hull's memorandum of the conversation‑see S.D. II, 687‑689.

23

Although the Japanese government had repeatedly attempted to approach the American point of view during the past six months, Foreign Minister Togo did not believe that the United States had attempted in, any way to study sympathetically Japan's position. America was apparently unaware that the population of Japan had increased to approximately 100,000,000 and in order to support this increasing number of people it would be necessary to secure more raw materials. In order to offset this growing situation, further delay in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion to the present conversations could not be tolerated. Foreign Minister Togo urged that the United States government adopt a statesmanlike position by overcoming the major difficulties by the time the Japanese Diet met on November 15, 1941. Foreign Minister Togo continued by saying that the new Cabinet had arrived at the maximum number of concessions which Japan could make to the United States government. [116] With this statement the Japanese Foreign Minister handed Ambassador Grew the new Japanese proposals. [117] and then commented upon them.

Although the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 were based largely on those of the United States issued on June 21, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo recognized that it contained many unsatisfactory clauses with regard to both text and substance. Nevertheless, in order to expedite the present conversations, Foreign Minister Togo had used the Japanese draft of September 25, 1941 as the basis for these which he was now handing to Ambassador Grew. However, they contained certain modifications in order to meet the United States proposals as set forth in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941. [118]

In regard to the attitudes of both governments toward the European War, it was Foreign Minister Togo's understanding that the views expressed in the Japanese draft of September 25, 1941 were agreeable to both governments. In the matter of commercial discrimination the Japanese government had expanded its concessions in these new proposals in order to meet the requirements set down by the United States. Recognizing that the question of Japanese troops in China remained the greatest obstacle to the successful conclusion of the conversations, the Japanese government, in spite of grave domestic problems, had made further concessions.

Since Japan realized that British interests in the Far East would be affected by the discussions between Japan and the United States, Foreign Minister Togo appreciated Secretary Hull's desire to consult the British government. In fact, he hoped that the United States would persuade the British government to conclude an agreement with Japan along the same lines as the one being discussed between Japan and the United States.

At the conclusion of these observations on the new Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Togo again urged that Ambassador Grew continue his cooperation toward a speedy end to the negotiations. Foreign Minister Togo felt that Tokyo should not merely duplicate the conversations taking place in Washington but should supplement exchanges of information already handled in the Washington conferences with the goal of expediting the progress of peace.

Ambassador Grew did not feel that he had the authority to debate at the present time the questions which would be discussed in Washington; however, he did raise three points pertinent to those discussions. Ambassador Grew disagreed with the idea that the United States government did not recognize the situation in the Far East. He felt that Ambassador Nomura in Washington and the Japanese Embassy as a whole had given the United States a very clear picture of the problems there. Foreign Minister Togo's description of Japan as a "stabilizing force in East Asia" was, Ambassador Grew stated, open to very wide interpretation.

[116] S.D. II, 710‑714.

[117] See "Document handed by Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 7, 1941", S.D. 11, 709‑710.

[118] S.D. II, 710‑714.

24

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

However, Ambassador Grew realized that Foreign Minister Togo's observation that Japan must have access to necessary supplies penetrated to the very center of the problem. Here Ambassador Grew took the opportunity to point out that Secretary Hull's peaceful program visualized for Japan a free flow of trade and commerce and the opening of new markets for its industries.

In reply, Foreign Minister Togo admitted that the Japanese Embassy had reported the Far Eastern situation accurately to the American State Department, but he still doubted whether the United States government appreciated its seriousness. By way of illustrating his point, Foreign Minister Togo referred to the Russian troops stationed in Outer Mongolia, recognized as part of China, and he remarked that no one had as yet objected to the presence of these troops. In answering Ambassador Grew's comment on the "interpretation of stabilizing force in East Asia", Foreign Minister Togo stated that it could be understood from a purely common sense point of view. In regard to Ambassador Grew's statements on the question of assuring raw materials to Japan, Foreign Minister Togo referred briefly to the economic pressure applied by the United States which had menaced the national existence of Japan to a far greater degree than the direct use of force. He warned of the possibility of Japan's being forced to measures of self‑defense in order to overcome the effects of continued economic pressure. If the American government realized that Japan would collapse if forced to sacrifice the fruits of its protracted war with China, Foreign Minister Togo believed that the United States would conclude the conversations successfully without further delay.

Ambassador Grew pointed out that Japan could not hope to retain the fruits of aggression and, at the same time, propose the rejection of aggression and force. However, Foreign Minister Togo stated that Japan was not conducting an aggressive war with China. Then he insisted that under the plea of self‑defense, the American government had resorted to measures far beyond those generally recognized by international law as defensive. Summing up his opinions, Foreign Minister Togo stated that theoretical talks should end and that conversations in the future should be pursued along realistic lines. [118a]

b. Foreign Minister Togo's Report [119]

On November 10, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo met with Ambassador Grew and Counselor Dooman in order to inform the American representatives that after a conference between the Foreign Office and the military high command the Japanese government was now prepared to submit its final proposals. After examining the results of the negotiations between Japan and the United States so far, Foreign Minister Togo had come to the conclusion that the United States did not have a workable understanding of the far Eastern situation. In spite of the fact that Secretary Hull called Japan the stabilizing influence of the Pacific, Foreign Minister Togo said it was obvious from his other remarks that he did not fully appreciate Japan's actual status. Because the United States lacked this understanding it had refused to make any concessions whatsoever during the six months' long conversations with the Japanese representatives. Apparently the United States did not take into consideration the fact that Japan's population of 100,000,000 people was ever increasing, and it was necessary for them to obtain raw materials in order to maintain their existence. Urging the United States government to take all these points into consideration in future negotiations, Foreign Minister Togo stated emphatically that unless some change was evident in America's attitude the Japanese people as a whole would be forced to doubt the sincerity of the American government. [120]

[118a] Ibid.

[119] IV, 68-71.

[120] IV, 68

25

After these preliminary remarks Foreign Minister Togo handed Ambassador Grew the English text of the final Japanese counter proposals. [121]

In an attempt to clarify certain points contained in these proposals, Foreign Minister Togo said that his government believed it had set forth its attitude toward the European war fully in the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941. Therefore, it had seen no reason to elaborate on that point further in these present proposals. In regard to the policy of nondiscrimination in commerce, Japan had made more liberal concessions in order to meet the demands of the United States. As a final attempt to reach an understanding regarding, the important problem of Japanese troops in China the Japanese government had decided to make further compromises. In view of the liberal concessions made them, Foreign Minister Togo urged that the United States accept Japan's latest proposals and also induce Great Britain to sign a similar agreement with Japan. Since he had no instructions from Washington, Ambassador Grew declined to pass his opinion on the Japanese proposals. However, he did feel it necessary to point out to Foreign Minister Togo that the United States government had a very clear picture of the Oriental situation since he himself had submitted detailed reports. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew felt that the present negotiations were aimed at supplying Japan all the materials necessary to maintain an advantageous position in the Far East. [122]

While expressing his appreciation of Ambassador Grew's cooperation, Foreign Minister Togo refuted the Ambassador's insistence that the present negotiations were designed to grant Japan a larger market for purchasing raw materials by pointing out that America's freezing regulations had placed such strong economic pressure on Japan that the Japanese people themselves were beginning to feel the need for effecting even stronger measures for self‑defense. From the attitude of the United States toward China, Foreign Minister Togo continued, it was obvious that the American government wished to ignore the sacrifices that the Japanese people had been forced to make during the four and one‑half years of warfare. In view of that fact, it would be suicidal for Japan to make such liberal concessions to China as the United States government desired. At this point in the conversation Counselor Dooman interrupted Foreign Minister Togo to state that the United States could never accept the results of aggression. Foreign Minister Togo replied that the Japanese government had never considered its war with China one of aggression. Any military action taken by Japan in the Far East, he continued, had been merely in the interest of self‑defense. Although not wishing to argue this point further, Foreign Minister Togo insisted that the United States had been wrongfully magnifying Japan's moves in the Pacific. [123]

From the conversation Foreign Minister Togo concluded that the United States still considered that its negotiations with Japan were in the preliminary stage. Ambassador Grew had continually referred to them merely as "conversations". Foreign Minister Togo had stressed that by this time the conversations were well within the realm of "negotiations". Ambassador Grew was apparently satisfied with this term. [124]

37. Ambassador Nomura Reveals America's Pessimistic Attitude Toward the Negotiations

From informal discussions with various American officials Ambassador Nomura came to the conclusion that America regarded its present negotiations with Japan in a pessimistic light.

On November 10, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent a summary of the remarks of these Americans to the Foreign Office in Tokyo. [125] As one example of America's attitude Ambassa‑

[121] IV, 25‑28.

[122] IV, 69.

[123] IV, 70.

[124] IV, 71.

[125] IV, 72.

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

dor Nomura pointed to a conversation between Frederick Moore, legal advisor to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, and Senator Thomas of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Moore had reported to Ambassador Nomura that the United States was prepared to fight if Japan made another invasion in the South Pacific. Not only was the American navy ready for action, but psychologically, the American people were expecting a war.

On the previous evening a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet had discussed the question of Japanese‑American relations with Ambassador Nomura. In view of his friendship with the Japanese Ambassador, this unnamed Cabinet member stated frankly that the United States government was expecting another aggressive move on the part of Japan in the Far East within a few days. Because of this information neither President Roosevelt nor the United States government, as a whole, believed that Ambassador Kurusu's arrival in the United States would be able to improve the present situation. In an attempt to offset this feeling Ambassador Nomura had explained that the Japanese people were forced to take some action because of the American freezing negotiations. Nevertheless, anxious to avoid a war with the United States, Japan desired an immediate agreement. Ambassador Nomura's remarks, however, failed to convince the American Cabinet member. [126]

With the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst papers, Ambassador Nomura reported American newspapers and magazines held the opinion that the American people were more eager for war with Japan than with Germany. Ambassador Nomura firmly believed that the British government was using this American attitude to its own advantage by initiating negotiations for joint Anglo‑American action in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura reminded his government that at the present time Britain was forced to divert some of its fleet to the Pacific. Even in the event that President Roosevelt and other American statesmen did not desire to replace the British fleet in the Far East with American warships, Ambassador Nomura had it on good authority that the United States could not stop its aid to Britain since by this time it had become a question of saving American "face." Ambassador Nomura concluded his report by stating that he was to confer with President Roosevelt and would submit a more detailed statement on the results of the conversation. [127]

38. Roosevelt‑Nomura Conversation (November 10, 1941)

a. Secretary Hull's Report [128]

Accompanied by Minister Wakasugi, Ambassador Nomura called on President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull on November 10, 1941. After a few preliminary remarks, Ambassador Nomura read the following communication from the Japanese government. He recalled to the American representatives' minds that on September 25, 1941 the Japanese government made its last proposals. From the observations of the American State Department seen in the answering document of October 2, 1941, the Japanese government had determined that the present difficulties arose from three major points: (1) the application of the principle of non‑discrimination in international commercial relations; (2) the attitude of the two governments toward the European War; (3) the question of the stationing and withdrawing of Japanese forces.

Ambassador Nomura stated that, in regard to the principle of non‑discrimination, the Japanese government had now decided to agree to its application in all the Pacific areas including China, provided that the principle was similarly applied to the rest of the world. Since Secretary Hull had repeatedly stated that it was his long‑cherished desire to apply the non‑discriminatory principle to the whole world, Ambassador Nomura felt that the United States government would be gratified at Japan's statement.

[126] Ibid.

[127] IV, 73.

[128] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State"‑November 10, 1941, S.D. II, 715‑719.

27

On the second question regarding the European war, the Japanese government had proposed on September 25, 1941 that both governments be guided in their conduct by considerations of preservation and self‑defense. However, Ambassador Nomura had been instructed to inquire whether the United States would give assurance that it had no intention of interpreting "preservation and self‑defense" too liberally. On the basis of reciprocity, the Japanese government was willing to give similar reassurances. In the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 it was stated that "in case the United States should participate in the European war, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation". Under the present circumstances, Japan could not make any further concessions in this matter for, unless there was mutual trust and confidence between Japan and the United States, a thousand words would not be a satisfactory assurance. [128a]

However, in regard to the stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces, the government in Tokyo had decided to submit further guarantees. Japanese forces would be retained in specified areas of North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan Island for a certain required time after the restoration of a Japanese‑Chinese peace. The withdrawal of forces from the other parts of occupied China would be accomplished within two years after the establishment of peace and order. Ambassador Nomura emphasized, however, that the Japanese government had made a great many more concessions along these lines than previously. He hoped that the United States government would agree that the complete and immediate withdrawal of Japanese forces from all of China was impracticable at the present time. The recall of forces from French Indo‑China would follow the firm establishment of equitable peace in East Asia by the settlement of the China affair.

After completing his observations on the concessions made by the new Japanese government, Ambassador Nomura read a statement which he had prepared. As viewed from the Japanese standpoint, Ambassador Nomura said, the United States government had shown little signs of reciprocating the concessions forwarded by Japan in an endeavor to terminate the six months of informal conversations successfully. Ambassador Nomura declared that for this reason certain factions in Japan viewed the true intentions of the United States government with skepticism. Japanese public opinion viewed the freezing of Japanese assets as economic warfare insomuch as it cut them off from the supply of materials vital to their industries. From reports of the growing intensity of the situation, Ambassador Nomura concluded that an amicable and satisfactory understanding must be arrived at without any unnecessary loss of time. In an effort to surmount the present difficulties, the Japanese government had submitted these new proposals. Ambassador Nomura was of the firm opinion that if some understanding were reached by the two countries, the psychological effect upon the Japanese people would be extremely favorable. [128b]

Ambassador Nomura then stated that Ambassador Kurusu had been sent to assist him in the present conversations and that parallel conversations would take place in Tokyo between Foreign Minister Togo and Ambassador Grew. Attempting to forestall any misinterpretations of the statements he had made, Ambassador Nomura asked that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull forgive his transgression from the terminology of trained diplomats since his main objective was the establishment of peace.

In speaking of the present commercial policy which was unfavorable toward Japan, Ambassador Nomura mentioned the sea conference which had taken place between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. He complained that when Japan went

[128a] Ibid.

[128a] Ibid.

28

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

into Shantung, they were allowed to remain only some six years, at the end of which time they were forced to move out their troops.

As a means of establishing a basis for peace, stability and order in the Pacific area and, in the time to come, throughout the world, President Roosevelt said he believed it essential to lay practical emphasis on the sound philosophy of human welfare and that the exploratory conversations would achieve favorable results as the American government would expedite the conversations in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese government. However, President Roosevelt desired that Japan demonstrate its intention of pursuing a peaceful course instead of the aggressive one which it had been following up to the present time. Then President Roosevelt declared that during the age through which the world was passing, it was necessary to look one hundred years in the future. He referred to the extra‑territorial costs and the unusual conditions which had been existing throughout China in the past thirty years and he stated that the Chinese government had gone through a new experience. Referring to Ambassador Nomura's statements regarding the Shantung problem, President Roosevelt pointed out that it had taken three years to dispose of that question while the Japanese-American conversations had consumed only six months.

Ambassador Nomura then dwelled briefly on the problem of getting the Japanese troops out of China by degrees, insisting that there would be neither annexation nor indemnity in doing so.

As the interview drew to a close, nothing was said about the time for the next conversation, however, Ambassador Nomura reminded President Roosevelt that Ambassador Kurusu was expected about Saturday, November 15, 1941, and although he had nothing new to add to the present discussion, Ambassador Nomura stated that Mr. Kurusu would assist him in future conversations. President Roosevelt assured the Japanese Ambassador that he expected to confer with Mr. Kurusu. [129]

b. Ambassador Nomura's Report

At a conference with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid newspaper publicity, Ambassador Nomura explained to the American representatives Japan's final concessions toward peace. [130]

Ambassador Nomura began by saying that he had been unable to speak with Secretary Hull for almost three weeks, [131] and ever since the resignation of Prince Konoye's Cabinet Ambassador Nomura had been hoping for an interview with President Roosevelt. Since the informal conversations had been in progress for almost six months the Japanese government at this time hoped for a quick settlement of all the Far Eastern problems. However, as the negotiations dragged on without any apparent progress, the Japanese people had become impatient. In view of the fact that the United States had refused to make any concessions equal to those made by Japan, the Japanese people were doubting America's sincerity. At the present time Japan's domestic situation was serious because the Japanese people were unable to obtain the supply of materials necessary to their industry. Here Ambassador Nomura stated that an economic blockade was as harmful to a country as a shooting war. Nevertheless, anxious to maintain peace in the Pacific, the Japanese government had continued the conversations with the United States representatives. [132]

As a final effort in obtaining its objective, the Japanese government had made a maximum number of concessions in its proposal to the United States. [133]

In response to these remarks President Roosevelt stated that the United States government also had as its main objective the establishment of peace in the Pacific based on the spirit

[129] Ibid.

[130] IV, 74‑76.

[131]  Note Ambassador Nomura's conversation with Secretary Hull on November 7, 1941.

[132] IV, 76.

[133] IV, 77.

29

of fair play. Agreeing with the desire of the Japanese government to continue peace parleys, President Roosevelt said that the United States had two objectives in mind: one, the prevention of war and, two, the maintenance of a lasting peace. [134]

Since the Japanese government appreciated the seriousness of the situation at this time, Ambassador Nomura continued, Ambassador Kurusu was being sent to the Embassy in Washington.

Ambassador Nomura then resumed his explanation of the latest Japanese counter proposals. He stated that these present proposals were based on the former Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 and modified to meet the demands of the American government expressed in the United States proposals of October 2, 1941 as well as the opinions of Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles in subsequent conversations. In regard to the application of the non‑discriminatory commercial policy in the entire Pacific area, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that his government had guaranteed the extension of this policy even to China. In view of the fact that Secretary Hull had continually spoken of his desire to see this commercial policy in practice throughout the world, the Japanese government was certain that its guarantees would meet with the approval of the United States. The attitude of the Japanese government toward the European war, as it had previously stated in its proposal of September 25, 1941. would be based on the need for "protection and self-defense." However, Japan expected to receive a guarantee that the United States would not interpret these terms in too broad a sense. Unless, however, both governments placed unreserved confidence in each other, Ambassador Nomura said, no guarantee would be satisfactory. [135]

In clarifying the third and most important issue between the two governments Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan was now prepared to establish the localities in China where it would be necessary to retain its troops, and also to guarantee the period of occupation. Although realizing that the United States desired to have Japanese forces withdrawn immediately, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that it would be impossible to effect such a move at the present time. However, he urged the United States to consider Japan's concessions in the light of actual circumstances. Ambassador Nomura concluded his remarks by submitting Japan's proposal regarding its troops in French Indo‑China. After Ambassador Nomura had finished, President Roosevelt said that the whole world had fallen into a state of confusion because of the militaristic policies of certain countries. In an attempt to return to normalcy, the United States government has sought the establishment of peace and order in the Pacific. With that goal in mind President Roosevelt himself had assisted in the preliminary conversations in order to find a basis for such peace. Before going any further, however, President Roosevelt felt it necessary to receive a definite guarantee that the Japanese government intended to cease its aggression and adopt a peaceful course in the Far East. [136]

In an attempt to abolish the economic limitations to which Japan referred, President Roosevelt continued, he had conferred with Prime Minister Churchill on the issue of nondiscrimination. Both countries' main objection to Germany was the fact that it followed a policy contrary to that idea while both Great Britain and the United States wished to apply the principle of non‑discrimination to the entire world. Referring to the administration of President Taft when the United States had resorted to a policy of force in Cuba, President Roosevelt pointed out that America's relations with the Latin American countries had been highly favorable. Once the United States had adopted a new and peaceful policy, relations

[134] IV, 75.

[135] IV, 77.

[136] IV, 78.

30

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

with those countries had improved. At this point Ambassador Nomura reminded President Roosevelt that America's economic pressure was now causing the anti‑American attitude throughout Japan. President Roosevelt continued his remarks by stating that it was necessary to find a modus vivendi before a satisfactory conciliation could be worked out between the two countries. Ambassador Nomura interpreted this statement to mean that President Roosevelt desired a provisional agreement. As the conference drew to a close, President Roosevelt asked whether Ambassador Kurusu was bringing additional Japanese proposals from Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura replied that Mr. Kurusu's only reason for coming was to act as an assistant to the Japanese Ambassador. Since President Roosevelt was leaving for Warm Springs, Georgia, on November 15, 1941 to attend a Thanksgiving celebration there, he hoped for the opportunity of conversing with Ambassador Kurusu before his departure. [137]

39. Japanese‑American Conversation (November 10,1941) [138]

Because of an interruption, Ambassador Nomura had failed to make two points clear to Secretary Hull during the conversation earlier that morning. Therefore, Minister Wakasugi called upon Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine to make an appointment for Ambassador Nomura to see Secretary Hull either on the evening of November 10, 1941 or in the morning of November 11.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The first of the points to be discussed in the next conversation related to Japan's desire to reach some successful agreement before the Japanese Diet met on November 15, 1941. The second point was in connection with Secretary Hull's statement made on November 7, 1941 proposing the development of a new relationship between Japan and China by means of mutual pledges of conciliation and friendship.

Mr. Wakasugi said that the Japanese government was extremely interested in Secretary Hull's proposals and desired that he elaborate on them further. Mr. Ballantine promised to speak with Secretary Hull and relay his message to Minister Wakasugi. [139]

40. Japan Doubts America's Awareness of the Critical Situation

From the fact that little progress had been made in the informal conversations, Foreign Minister Togo concluded that the United States did not appreciate how critical the situation in the Far East actually was. [140] In order to emphasize this fact Foreign Minister Togo urged Ambassador Nomura to speak to Secretary Hull and other American representatives in order to give them a clear picture of Japanese‑American relations. As Foreign Minister Togo had stated in previous messages to the Japanese Ambassador, a settlement of some kind must be reached before November 25, 1941. The Japanese Parliament would begin its session on November 15, 1941 and before its meeting was concluded it would be necessary that Japan have on hand at least a tentative agreement with the United States. [141]